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A B S T R A C T
Using a Santiago, Chile, health group as an
ethnographic case study, I propose ‘‘accountable
democracy’’ as an alternative normative project to
the theory of deliberative democracy outlined by
Habermas in Between Facts and Norms. Accountable
democracy has at its center the impact of
public-sphere opinion formation on decision
making by officials in elected governments.
[accountability, Chile, democracy, Habermas, Latin
America, normative theory, social movements]
I
n his introduction to Jürgen Habermas’s Structural Transforma-
tion of the Public Sphere, Thomas McCarthy asks ‘‘is democracy
possible?’’ (1989:xii). By this he means, ‘‘Can the public sphere be
effectively reconstituted under radically different socioeconomic,
political, and cultural conditions?’’ For Habermas (1989), the public
sphere is an arena for rational argument leading to consensus; historically
the bourgeois public sphere had the capacity to transform the state and
its modes of rule. McCarthy’s statement makes it clear that the concept of
‘‘public sphere’’ has been taken as a model for democratic (inter)action.1
In Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy (1996a), Habermas develops that idea further by
explicitly making deliberation a centerpiece of his normative vision of
democracy (see also Habermas 1996b). In this later work, however, the
mechanism for the impact of public opinion on governmental decision
making is left unclear.
In this article, I critically examine Habermas’s normative framework
connecting democracy to the practice of deliberation. I suggest that the
question of publics’ impact on governmental decision making should not
remain peripheral or ambiguous but, rather, should be placed at the center
of normative democratic theory. My point is not to discredit deliberation
but, instead, to identify it as a necessary but insufficient condition for
democracy, which must also entail the impact of public opinion on public
policy and law. Presenting an analysis growing out of ethnographic fieldwork
conducted in Santiago, Chile, in the early 1990s, I propose redirect-
ing normative democratic theory toward notions of accountability, as
expressed by the term accountable democracy. For me, this term has two
interconnected meanings. First, in an accountable democracy the link
between opinion formation in the public sphere and decision making in
the elected government is sufficiently direct for policy makers to enact into
law and put into practice expressed desires of citizens. In this sense, policy
makers are accountable to the people. A second meaning grows directly out
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Chile: the notion that in an accountable democracy citi-
zens’ ideas are ‘‘taken into account’’ by lawmakers engaged
in policy formation. In both of these senses, the standard
for democracy is citizens’ impact on policy and law.
My rethinking of the deliberative democracy literature
developed through reflection on ‘‘actually existing’’ dem-
ocratic practices. In postdictatorship Chile, the attempt to
generate consensus through conversation—which, in the
form of rational discussion, Habermas elevates to a com-
municative and democratic ideal—was, in practice, used
to forestall, rather than facilitate, the impact of public
opinion on decision making. In fact, Chilean political elites
used a Habermasian language of consensus and debate to
exclude nonelite Chileans from influencing public policy.
Here the adoption of a discourse-centered operative
framework was a mechanism for disarticulating organized
groups and diffusing their demands. Citizens and commu-
nity organizations were thereby faced with the strategic
question of how to achieve their goals when the practices
of discussion and debate and a language of consensus
were used to deter them; they faced the challenge, that is,
of determining what sorts of actions to take when the
limits of discussion’s effectiveness had been reached.
Moreover, foreclosing the Chilean public’s impact on
governmental decision making was, in part, actively
achieved through the practices and discourses of democ-
racy. In the postdictatorship period, Chilean politicians
used public opinion polls as legitimating mechanisms to
demonstrate that citizens’ desires had been communi-
cated to public officials who had then put them into effect,
even—or especially—when the officials, in fact, had not
done so (Paley 2001a). And, as described later in this
article, when a health group requested resources to pre-
vent the spread of meningitis, citizens were asked to
refrain from pressuring the state to fulfill their demands,
in order to preserve democracy. In these two ways, the
tools and concepts of contemporary democracy were
used to block, rather than enact, public opinion’s influence
on governmental decision making. Because of these fis-
sures or lapses in the practice of democracy, I suggest that
what is needed is a normative theory with a strategic
orientation: one that can move beyond impasses in con-
temporary democratic practices—including those that use
Habermas’s own vocabulary of deliberation, consensus,
and debate to limit citizens’ impact on public policy.
Implementing this project depends not on following a
procedure but, rather, on the contingent, contextualized
decisions organized groups generate in the process of
analyzing, responding to, and reshaping the political con-
ditions in which they are situated.
Because social movements and community organiza-
tions articulate normative visions in the process of taking
practical action, they are a source not only of empirical
evidence but of normative theory, as well.2 The health
group Llareta, described in this article, actively engaged
in a process of deliberation, not unlike Habermas’s vision
of a public sphere. Yet the health promoters’ deliberation
served not as an end in and of itself but, instead, as a
process for conducting political analysis, reflecting on
experience, and developing strategic action. Their goal
was to generate possibilities for transforming relations of
power and impacting public decisions that affected their
lives. They associated having an impact on those decisions
with ‘‘true’’ democracy. In that sense, their activity and
vision serve as pointers for articulating an alternative
normative account.
The setting
My analysis has developed out of ethnographic research
conducted in Santiago, Chile, in the early 1990s. This period
immediately followed the end of military rule (1973–90)
and coincided with the onset of political democracy.
Chileans had had extensive experience with elected gov-
ernments, most recently under the Frei and Allende gov-
ernments in the late sixties and early seventies, during
which time social movements calling for radical change
mobilized and elite and military sectors of society resisted
sharply. The military regime that stepped in to curb what
it saw as a communist scourge repressed political parties,
labor unions, and popular social movements and reshaped
Chilean society by instituting a program of drastic neo-
liberal economic restructuring that privatized public ser-
vices, such as health care, education, and pensions.
The advent of elected-civilian rule in 1990 marked a
significant change in governance. It did not, however,
entail a sharp rupture with the dictatorship, nor did it
reinstate a system resembling Chile’s earlier democracy.
The transition developed out of negotiations between
opposition elites and the military government, with a
plebiscite and elections proceeding according to the dic-
tates of the existing (1980) constitution. This process
enabled a set of institutional continuities with the military
period. The former military ruler, Augosto Pinochet,
remained a powerful figure, first as head of the army
and then as senator-for-life; the Congress included eight
nonelected senators, who, in conjunction with elected
right-wing politicians, could veto reforms; a binomial
electoral system favored adherents to the prior military
government; and the 1980 constitution created during the
Pinochet regime remained in force, with some modifica-
tions.3 In addition, the newly elected politicians retained
the neoliberal economic model installed during the mili-
tary regime. Because of these continuities, in the early
1990s segments of the population expressed disillusion-
ment with Chilean democracy, calling it ‘‘democracy
in quotation marks,’’ ‘‘low intensity democracy,’’ and
‘‘democracy lite.’’4
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Reflecting on these phenomena, Chilean scholar
Tomás Moulian (1997) has suggested that transformism
(following Gramsci) might be a more accurate term than
transition to express political processes in Chile. He writes,
I call ‘‘transformism’’ the long process of preparation,
during the dictatorship, for an exit from the dictator-
ship, destined to permit the continuity of the basic
structures under other political robes, the democratic
wardrobe. The objective is . . . change in order to make
permanent. . . . The power regime changes, it passes
from a dictatorship to a certain form of democracy
and the political personnel in the positions of
command of the State change. But there is not a
change in the dominant block, despite a modification
in the model of domination. [Moulian 1997:145]5
Moulian’s formulation affirms that certain structures
were maintained in the shift from dictatorship to democ-
racy, but, at the same time, that transformations occurred
in modes and functioning of power. Unlike the authori-
tarian military government, the post-1990 elected Con-
certación (concerted action) government emphasized the
need for consensus, pragmatism, and negotiation. Yet,
although Concertación leaders claimed that consensus
characterized the country as a whole, a consensus was,
in fact, hammered out among political elites of various
parties in a way that bypassed large sectors of the
population. Nonetheless, although popular sectors were
excluded from pacts and negotiated agreements, Concer-
tación officials did agree to talk with community organi-
zations, something the former military government had
not done. In the early 1990s, elected officials attended
public assemblies and held meetings with community
organizations, whose members were also included in
municipal councils. In many cases, however, these
forums served as a mechanism less for channeling citi-
zens’ proposals into policy than for containing demands
by citizens’ organizations, by persuading groups not to
press forward with their claims, and by asserting that
fulfilling their requests would be untenable in the near
future. The strategic and organizational dilemma for
organizations unconvinced by this discourse and dissatis-
fied with the outcomes became how to hold the gov-
ernment accountable when talk was the medium par
excellence of pacification and demobilization.
The health team Llareta, with which I conducted
ethnographic research throughout the 1990s, was one
such organization. This grassroots group comprised seven
women and one man at the time of my research and was
based in La Bandera, a población (poor urban neighbor-
hood) in Santiago. Llareta was initially formed and its
members trained in 1984 by the nongovernmental orga-
nization Educación Popular en Salud (Popular Education
in Health), or EPES.6 In the first weeks of their training, the
new health promoters, who had been community leaders
in other organizations before that time, wanted to focus
their efforts on the direct provision of health services, for
example, by treating wounds and administering medicine
by injection. This seemed particularly urgent to them,
given inadequate health services and serious health prob-
lems caused by poverty and military violence. Nonethe-
less, through the process of training, the health promoters
transformed their vision of the organization’s goals. They
began to focus on educating neighbors about preven-
tive health measures, critiquing the privatization of the
national health system, and bringing pressure to bear on
public authorities to provide care. Their approach built on
a broad understanding that defined health not just as the
absence of sickness but also as access to nutrition, edu-
cation, a clean environment, recreation, housing, dignified
work, physical and mental development, and human
rights. In seeking to change the large-scale structural
conditions that affected the health of their families and
communities broadly conceived, in the mid-1980s, Llareta,
in conjunction with EPES, participated in the widespread
protest movement that aimed to end Chile’s dictatorship
and bring about democracy.
When regime change did finally occur in 1990, it
inaugurated a period of nominal democracy. But it also
brought with it a series of complexities that presented new
challenges to popular organizations such as the health
group. Specifically, in the early 1990s, Llareta was con-
fronting the paradox that its neighborhood had been more
extensively organized under the military regime than during
political democracy, it was facing the challenge of analyzing
the nature of the incipient political system and its forms of
enacting power, and it was seeking to determine the kinds of
strategies that could most effectively address ongoing con-
cerns about health and poverty in the postdictatorship
context. One of the most potent challenges Llareta faced
was that the post-1990 elected Concertación government
appeared to welcome citizen involvement by emphasizing
participation by both individual volunteers and community
organizations while governing in a way that, in practice,
excluded popular sectors from impact on economic and
political decisions. The language of consensus and the
invitation to be in conversation with governing officials,
therefore, became a power dynamic that the health group
found it necessary to analyze, resist, and transform in its
efforts to reshape health conditions in the población.
Normative theory: Deliberative democracy
These ethnographic observations are important entry
points for a critical rethinking of the normative literature
on democracy, specifically Habermas’s linking of rational
debate with democracy. In reconsidering that literature, it is
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important to note the evolution of thinking in Habermas’s
own work. In The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere (1989), a primarily historical account, Habermas
conveys a strong sense that opinion generated in the public
sphere has an impact on governing officials. The bourgeois
public sphere is a body engaged in a degree of confrontation
(Habermas 1989:27) with rulers: Debating publics engage in
‘‘criticism of public authority’’ (Habermas 1989:51; see also
59– 60) and, in the process, transform modes of rule—
‘‘change domination as such’’ (Habermas 1989:28). The
public sphere that emerged in the 1700s in Europe was ‘‘a
forum in which the private people, come together to form a
public, readied themselves to compel public authority to
legitimate itself before public opinion. The publicum devel-
oped into the public, the subjectum into the [reasoning]
subject, the receiver of regulations from above into the
ruling authorities’ adversary’’ (Habermas 1989:25–26, em-
phasis added).
The critical and confrontational mode attributed to
the early bourgeois public sphere was attenuated by the
emergence of constitutional systems in which ‘‘the public
character of parliamentary deliberations assured public
opinion of its influence; it ensured the connection
between delegates and voters as parts of one and the
same public’’ (Habermas 1989:83, emphasis added). That
is, formal democratic institutions, brought into being ini-
tially through the ability of the public sphere to reshape
modes of rule, are assumed to channel public opinion
into policy, such that intentional, organized, and confron-
tational action by the population becomes unnecessary to
achieving influence.
Habermas’s later volume, Between Facts and Norms:
Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy
(1996a), solidifies that view of parliamentary democracy
and recasts it in a normative frame. In this work, deliber-
ation becomes the centerpiece of democracy (see also
Habermas 1996b). Here the sense of conflict and confron-
tation with—and transformation of—governing authorities
present in Structural Transformation’s historical account
largely recedes. In its place, Habermas envisions a ‘‘two
track’’ model in which an opinion-forming civil society
(what Nancy Fraser calls a ‘‘weak public’’ [1992:134]
because it does not engage in decision making) influences
a decision-making parliament (what Fraser calls a ‘‘strong
public’’ because its work includes ‘‘both opinion forma-
tion and decision making’’ [1992:134]). In one formulation,
‘‘Informal public opinion-formation generates ‘influence’;
influence is transformed into ‘communicative power’
through the channels of political elections; and commu-
nicative power is again transformed into ‘administrative
power’ through legislation’’ (Habermas 1996b:28).
But the nature of these transformations is not fully
explicated, so that the exact mechanism through which
and the extent to which opinion formation shapes deci-
sion making is left unexplained (see Scheuerman 1999:
168). In Habermas’s own words, ‘‘[the] image of delibera-
tive politics . . . is . . . silent about the relation between
decision-oriented deliberations, which are regulated by
democratic procedures, and the informal processes of
opinion-formation in the public sphere’’ (1996a:306–307,
first emphasis added).
In this article, I challenge that silence by proposing that
the question of publics’ influence on decision making be
placed front and center in a normative theory of democracy.
In the context of postdictatorship Chile, the question of how
citizens, particularly the urban poor, could become ‘‘strong
publics’’—both opinion formers and decision makers—
was strategically crucial for urban social movements and
popular organizations, as was the question of how citi-
zens could directly influence decisions made by politi-
cians. Because the question of publics’ influence on
decision making was so deeply contested and so central
to the activity of governance and social movement activity,
it stands out as a key question for a normative theory
of democracy.
Democracy’s many meanings
Democracy is not a single idea. Rather, it is imbued with
multiple meanings by distinctive social actors who deploy
the term strategically in power-laden relationships and
shift meanings over time in response to other actions
and iterations.7 Correspondingly, perspectives on citizens’
roles in affecting policy differed historically with the
changing political conditions of Chile’s process of regime
transition. In the late 1980s, during the campaigns leading
up to the 1988 plebiscite and 1989 presidential election,
politicians opposing the military regime then in power
associated democracy with (among other things) taking
the population’s opinions into account. These meanings
appear to have been drawn from the demands and aspira-
tions of social movements and social organizations active
at the time. After the elected government took power in
1990, the emphasis shifted to a definition that virtually
equated democracy with elections and that posited public
officials in the civilian government as, by definition, rep-
resenting the interests of the population. Concurrently,
politicians aimed to limit social mobilizations by using a
language of consensus and participation they associated
with democracy. Reading documents from the 1980s
and early 1990s, one can thus see a change in rhetoric
from the plebiscite campaign to the rhetoric of the early
years of Concertación governance. The earlier language of
accountability gave way to a logic presuming the public’s
influence on governmental decision making amid a prac-
tice of fostering weak publics unable effectively to do so.
This ideological transition was not accepted by mem-
bers of Llareta, who, in the early 1990s articulated being
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‘‘taken into account’’ as part of their criteria for democracy.
Indeed, governing officials’ calls for consensus and conver-
sation during that period while at the same time creating
structural conditions to limit the impact of popular sectors
on policy became a power dynamic Llareta sought to
challenge. In a way that closely resembled Habermas’s
public-sphere idea, members of the health group frequently
engaged in deliberation. But they used such deliberation
as a means to strategize alternatives and seek modes of
action that would go beyond talk in opening possibilities
for popular sectors to impact public decision making.
The following sections analyze the divergent meanings of
democracy—and differing visions of the relation between
citizens and public officials—embedded in these different
historical moments and conversations.
The NO and Aylwin presidential campaigns’ visions of democracy
In the mid-1980s, the opposition to the military dictator-
ship became divided into two large movements: the
Democratic Popular Movement and the Democratic Alli-
ance. Although these groups often collaborated during
protest activities during that time, they also had ideologi-
cal and strategic differences. By 1986, when the protests
were stifled by repression following a failed assassination
attempt on Pinochet and the discovery of an arms cache
in northern Chile, moderate political actors associated
with the Democratic Alliance sought to create a negoti-
ated regime transition. The vehicle for this had been
written into the 1980 constitution: a plebiscite to be held
in the late 1980s to determine whether or not General
Pinochet should remain in power. Opponents of the
dictator had previously rejected the plebiscite, holding
that participation in it would constitute tacit acceptance
of what they considered a fraudulent constitution. In
1986, however, opposition leaders made a strategic deci-
sion to change their course of action and attempt to end
the dictatorship by winning the plebiscite. It was this
strategy that ultimately led to Chile’s return to elected-
civilian rule.
The plebiscite was structured such that a win for the
YES alternative would mean that General Pinochet would
continue in power for another eight years, whereas a NO
victory would result in presidential elections. The NO
campaign aimed to register citizens and capture votes
through a range of techniques, including door-to-door
visits and massive demonstrations. It also developed a
political marketing campaign that featured 27 15-minute
television spots. Embedded in the speeches, slogans, and
images produced by this campaign were characterizations
of what constituted democracy. Although these notions
were developed for publicity—aiming to win votes rather
than to govern—they appear to have captured the aspira-
tions for and meanings of democracy at play in the years
leading up to the transition. The quotations cited below
come from flyers, leaflets, brochures, and other publicity
materials distributed by the NO campaign in 1988. I also
include materials from the 1989 election campaign of
Patricio Aylwin, showing that these characterizations of
democracy extended beyond the plebiscite into the pres-
idential elections.8
The overriding organizing schema of NO campaign
publicity is a contrast between democracy and military
rule. Here, democracy is framed (sometimes in these
precise terms, sometimes not) as the opposite of dic-
tatorship, everything dictatorship is not. The following
pamphlet, produced by the centrist Christian Demo-
cratic Party, the leading political party in the Concerta-
ción, was directed toward pobladores (residents of poor
urban neighborhoods).
Remember. Remember: The pain, the tears, the misery
that these fifteen years have given you. Remember:
the tortures, the disappearances, the exile. Remem-
ber: The humiliating treatment, the miserable salaries.
Remember: The charges for even sitting or going to
the bathroom in the health clinics. While you are
remembering, take on your power with your vote and
vote NO because This cannot go on! [Esto no da para
más! ]. [Partido Demócrata Cristiano 1988]
This pamphlet positions a vote for the NO option as a
way to end a decade and a half of military rule. It calls up
not only the political repression of the dictatorship (tor-
ture, disappearances, and exile) but also the day-to-day
humiliations and the miserably low salaries as well as the
petty fees. These nightmarish and mundane memories are
reasons given for voting NO in the plebiscite. But they are
also the specter against which democracy is defined, the
evil that establishes democracy as good.
Having staked out what a win for the NO would rid the
country of, the pamphlet goes on to describe the positive
aspects of a NO vote:
Voting for the NO means[:] To be taken into account
as persons with the right to express opinions. Free
presidential elections and a Congress freely elected.
Recuperate Health and Education for the pobla-
dores. Dignify the right to work with a just remu-
neration. Have access to all the social benefits.
Freely elect the leaders of the Neighborhood Coun-
cils [Juntas de Vecinos]. To have families with dig-
nified houses and without the fear of losing them.
Security in the streets and neighborhoods. To bring
an end to 15 years of injustices that each day are
deeper. [Partido Demócrata Cristiano 1988]
Here the pamphlet releases a cascade of meanings associ-
ated with the NO vote: political rights, including election of
the president, congress, and neighborhood councils; public
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services and economic benefits, including health, educa-
tion, a decent salary, housing, and public safety, especially
for the poor; and social qualities such as dignity and justice.
Lest anyone think that the decision on the vote was ab-
stract, the pamphlet insists that the choice will affect
individuals’ own living conditions: ‘‘It is your future and
that of your family when you vote: vote NO’’ (Partido
Demócrata Cristiano 1988). Although this pamphlet does
not explicitly equate the NO vote with democracy, others
do. For example, a leaflet produced by the National Com-
mand for the NO asks ‘‘What does voting NO in the
plebiscite mean for your future [?] . . . it means equal access
to health, education, housing, and work. . . . That is why
democracy is for you’’ (Comando Nacional por el NO 1988).
Contained in these pamphlets are meanings linked to
the NO vote that, by extension, accrue to democracy. Al-
lusions to elections and political institutions are present,
but they are interspersed with references to health, edu-
cation, housing, and other social benefits. By insisting that
it is ‘‘your future’’ that is at stake, the pamphlets suggest
that social aspirations will materialize in palpable changes
affecting the lives of citizens, especially the poor. Although
they do not make explicit promises for public services or
guarantee specific outcomes, the pamphlets articulate an
accumulation of expectations and aspirations for what
democracy will bring.
In addition to associating democracy and better living
conditions, these pamphlets include statements that are
especially pertinent to the normative project of ‘‘account-
able democracy’’ proposed in this article. The NO cam-
paign pamphlet highlights the right ‘‘to be taken into
account as persons with the right to express opinions.’’
Rephrased as ‘‘listening to the people,’’ this idea became a
central theme of Aylwin’s presidential campaign (Boe-
ninger 1990:62–63). For example, after making a series
of commitments to a ‘‘fair and solidary health system,’’ to
education that is ‘‘affordable to everyone, because it is a
right and not a privilege,’’ to fair compensation for work,
and to the equality and dignity of the poor, women, and
youth, one Aylwin publicity piece emphasizes that democ-
racy entails taking citizens’ opinions into account: ‘‘The
Democratic Government over which PATRICIO AYLWIN
will preside, will listen to the aspirations and proposals of
the diverse sectors of the society, respect the opinions, and
interpret the feelings of all the people of our country.
Because this is democracy’’ (Anonymous 1989).9
Here taking citizens’ proposals seriously is presented
as integral to democracy and a centerpiece of Aylwin’s
agenda for the presidency.
Concertación government’s vision of democracy
Although the NO campaign positioned the coming of
democracy as the end of injustice and the delivery of
long-postponed rights—summarized in the catchy cam-
paign jingle ‘‘happiness is on its way’’—politicians who
took positions in the elected government experienced a
very different set of dynamics in the 1990s than they had in
1988. As they took on the project of governing in the early
1990s, their primary interlocutors—those whose support
they needed for the transition to succeed—were not pop-
ular sectors and broad social movements whose backing
had helped them get into office, but oppositional political
elites. The Concertación faced a strong political right, a
sustained military presence, and a skeptical business com-
munity. Fully 43 percent of the electorate had voted YES
in the plebiscite, thereby voicing a desire to retain Pino-
chet in office, and 45 percent voted for right-wing candi-
dates in the presidential election. But beyond these votes,
the right was overrepresented in political institutions be-
cause the procedures instituted by the military regime and
institutionalized during the negotiated transition included
maintaining nonelected legislators in the Senate and a
complex binomial electoral system that gave excessive
strength to Pinochet’s followers. Despite the initial Con-
certación program having drawn ideas from the demands
of a broad range of organized groups in Chile, the ‘‘demo-
cracy of agreements’’ that emerged was based almost
exclusively on high-level (cupular) agreements with the
political right (Fazio 1996:33, see also 41). In part, the
choices the new government could make were constrained
by a series of pacts through which the transition had been
negotiated. In this context, the government maintained
macroeconomic equilibrium by continuing the neoliberal
economic model instituted by Pinochet and by fortifying
Chile’s insertion into the international economy; at the
same time, it implemented a tax reform that allowed for
limited increased expenditures on social services such as
health, education, and housing. These policies fit Chile’s
guiding principle for poverty alleviation in the early 1990s,
‘‘growth with equity,’’ by which the country would con-
tinue its course of economic growth while aiming to
improve distribution of the benefits. Some years later,
results showed that the percentage of the population living
in poverty and extreme poverty had dropped (relative to
the military years; it remained higher than before 1973) but
that inequality continued virtually unchanged from its
levels during the dictatorship, leaving Chile with one of
the most unequal income distributions in Latin America,
according to the World Bank.
Shaping their approach and undergirding the empha-
sis on consensus was a process of political ‘‘renovation’’
among members of leftist Chilean political parties. While
exiled in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, these leaders
experienced a disillusionment with actually existing
socialism in Eastern Europe, an appreciation of Western
European –style social democracy, and a revalorization
of democracy and democratic procedure as an end in
itself, decoupled from goals for economic transformation
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(see Walker 1991). They also engaged in self-criticism
about the history of the Allende period and the causes of
the 1973 military coup, attributing the breakdown of
Chilean democracy to excessive ideological polarization
and conflict among the population, a weakening of the
political center, and a loss of basic agreements (Walker
1991:454; see also Cortázar 1990:72). On their return to
Chile and their elevation to positions of power in the
elected Concertación government, former opposition
leaders self-consciously adopted a pragmatic realism that
accepted the military-installed neoliberal economic model
as fact and sought to maintain calm in the country
through negotiation and consensus with the political
right, the political descendants of the military regime.10
Renovated politicians of the Concertación, therefore, put
a priority on rebuilding consensus in Chilean politics and
saw this consensus as necessary for democracy.
The type of consensus in use by the Concertación
differs from Habermas’s meaning of the term, in which a
public sphere comes to agreement on the most rational
argument after engaging in rigorous debate. Instead, to
overcome seemingly insurmountable divisions, politicians
‘‘focused on points of agreement rather than differences
(a tactic of ‘conflict avoidance’) and employed a common
language that would permit debate. They emphasized
the importance of words and symbols in maintaining
the ‘culture of cooperation,’ or ‘culture of optimism,’ that
would permit the resolution of differences’’ (Giraldo
1997:266). In this process, the common language and
shared symbols build community and make possible
pragmatic advances around agreed-on areas. By the
same token, they limit ideas, foreclose dissent, and con-
strain debate. Those who do not participate in the
closed-language community are excluded. Rather than
admitting a variety of arguments into the public arena,
this procedure is premised on the premature closure of
ideas because disagreement is considered unhealthy
for democracy.
The yearning for consensus impacted policies toward
the population. Acknowledging that integration in the
international economy had not benefited the poorest
sectors of society and seeking to avert the social divisions
they blamed for the breakdown of Chilean democracy in
1973, governing officials sought to replace economic
improvements with symbols that would ‘‘integrate’’ the
population. Eugenio Tironi’s (1990) approach was both
foundational to the kinds of images utilized in the NO
campaign and influential in subsequent governing deci-
sions. Tironi wrote, ‘‘Not being open the possibility of
regressing to the old Welfare State, the democratic regimes
are obligated to look for forms to compensate for the
tendencies toward social segmentation maximizing the
use of factors of political integration’’ (1990:257). Giving
France’s celebration of its bicentennial as an example, he
noted ‘‘the value that is assigned in modern democracies
to the recreation of national symbols and the renewed
attention that is given to the functioning of institutions’’
(Tironi 1990:257). This valuation and focus implied that
the social unrest that might stem from economic privation
and the division that could result from income inequality
could be averted through the production of symbols to
unify the nation. Alejandro Foxley, Aylwin’s finance min-
ister, made this philosophy concrete by proposing that
Chile’s insertion into the international economy be the
symbol to rally around. He ‘‘hoped that Chile’s integration
into the international economy would serve as a shared
national project to mobilize and unify Chileans—the kind
of project that Chileans had been missing for decades. . . .
He invoked nationalistic pride in Chile’s ability to claim
space in world markets, to compete ‘in the first division.’ ’’
(Giraldo 1997:262 – 263). Such a project was consistent
with what James Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva
(1994), referring to a term coined by the United Nation’s
Economic Commission on Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC; Green 1995:188–189), call ‘‘neostructural-
ism,’’ and it was also followed in other countries, such as
Mexico, Argentina, and Spain (Giraldo 1997:262–263). The
choice of economic globalization as a national symbol to
overcome social and economic divisions is ironic because,
arguably, Chile’s insertion into the international economy
exacerbated income disparities. But its use indicates the
extent to which Concertación politicians prized consensus
and unity as they sought to overcome existing divisions,
even while enacting policies that neither resulted from the
decisions nor reflected the interests of large portions of
the population.
In addition to positioning international trade as both
unifying symbol and economic strategy, an important
part of the renovation process was a new appreciation
for formal political institutions. Renovated socialists
rejected the Leninist presumption that formal democracy
was bourgeois—a mainstay of Chilean leftist thought in
the 1960s and early 1970s—and came to value the formal
procedures of democracy, independent of economic
change. Intellectuals and politicians redefined socialism
as the deepening of democracy and considered it com-
patible with free market capitalism. This emphasis on the
formal institutions of democracy combined with free
market economics facilitated agreement among political
elites across the ideological spectrum. As stated in one
summary, ‘‘The political consensus that has characterized
the current process of institutional consolidation, is due
in large part to the fact that almost all the political
actors have the same conceptualization of democracy. . . .
[They consider it] a method by which the citizens choose
their political authorities, periodically and by way of
universal suffrage’’ (Cuevas Farren 1993:10, emphasis
added).11 Whereas, previously, democracy could be seen
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as a contested term characterized by ‘‘multivocality and
dispersion’’ (Sartori 1990:21, in Cuevas Farren 1993:9)
and one that attracted a multiplicity of accumulated
aspirations and demands by many social sectors, in this
incarnation it emerged as a unidimensional concept.
Unlike the meanings expressed in publicity for the NO
campaign, this definition did not associate democracy
with rights to health care, education, nutrition, housing,
and other public services. Neither did it specify that, in
democracy, elected officials would listen to the people.
Instead, it equated democracy with electoral procedures
generating representative political institutions.
Although this definition was formally articulated by
national political elites, I heard variations of it in local
politics, as well. For example, in the municipality of San
Ramón, the district in which La Bandera is located, I
asked a member of the municipal council about the local
government’s upcoming policies. He said he could not
tell me—the plans were secret—but that I should rest
assured that the decision would be democratic because it
was being made by elected officials. In saying this, he
was asserting that policy decisions were, by definition,
democratic if they were made by people voted into
office, regardless of what those decisions were, how
closely they corresponded to the desires of individual
citizens or organized groups, and whether the delibera-
tion process and the result were even publicly known.
Implicitly, he was contrasting decision making by elected
officials to decisions made by municipal functionaries
who had been appointed and who represented ongoing
authoritarianism during the Chilean political transition.
Although national elections took place in 1989 in time
for inauguration in 1990, municipal elections did not
occur until two years later, leaving most local govern-
ments in the first years of democracy to be run by
appointees of Pinochet.
The singular definition of democracy as a set of elec-
toral procedures and political institutions held by both
national and municipal politicians was significant not
merely because it excluded economic rights but, more
importantly, because it was actively employed to discour-
age citizens from demanding those rights. Politicians
perceived that organized groups making demands on the
state could create civil disturbance that would diminish
investor confidence, threaten macroeconomic stability,
and cause a political backlash of the right. Warning of
the danger of populist overflows (desbordes; Boeninger
1990:46), Concertación leaders held that it was necessary
for Chile’s government ‘‘to avoid at all costs’’ (Foxley
1990:117–118) the ‘‘populist cycle’’ (Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, in Foxley 1990:120) experienced in Argentina,
Brazil, and Peru (Giraldo 1997:252–253) as well as under
the Allende government in Chile, in which governing
political parties’ immediate capitulation to public
demands for higher state expenditures provoked hyperin-
flation and economic chaos, leading to a political crisis in
which the leaders were forced out of office as quickly as
they had been voted in.
The influence of popular sectors was so strongly to
be avoided that Concertación politicians even came to
‘‘value authoritarian limitations on democratic institu-
tions, such as designated senators, which denied the Con-
certación a legislative majority’’ (Giraldo 1997:267).
Politicians expressly admitted and, indeed, even openly
appreciated the fact that the political system was set up
not to channel public opinion into policy decisions but,
rather, to exclude citizens from influencing politicians. In
the words of finance minister Alejandro Foxley during a
1991 speech,
[They] forced us to reach broad agreements across the
political spectrum instead of taking the narrow view
of the parties in power. The new political landscape
has also served to modify the more radical elements
in the government coalition. . . . When you are forced
by the rules of the game to play moderate politics,
the process itself transforms people into moderate
politicians. . . . [The authoritarian legacy can] do an
unexpected service for political leaders of all the
parties in the search for and support of moderate
solutions. I would almost dare to say that it gives them
an excuse when facing their party bases, to be able to
select solutions different from those that were
possible under the old antagonistic ideological
schemes that still are alive in many sectors of the
national life. [Giraldo 1997:267 – 268, brackets in
original, emphasis added]12
To discourage widespread demands and to justify not
satisfying those being made, the Concertación govern-
ment launched a ‘‘civic education crusade’’ to persuade
the population not to pressure political leaders (Giraldo
1997). In La Bandera, for example, an elected represen-
tative told community leaders convened at a public
assembly that living in a democracy meant that the state
would not provide for community needs; local leaders
would themselves have to solve the problem of people
using public spaces as garbage dumps (see Paley 2001b:
165–173). Presenting democracy as a set of political insti-
tutions and procedures that had value in and of them-
selves, independent of economic changes, the politicians
communicated that ‘‘the new democracy would not be
able to solve immediately the innumerable economic
problems that had accumulated under military rule’’
(Giraldo 1997:254). In contrast to the meanings expressed
in NO campaign literature just a few years earlier that
linked democracy to the end of misery and the restitu-
tion of long-sought-after public services, they tried to
lower expectations of rapid economic change.13 Most
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importantly, and in apparent contrast to the theme of the
Aylwin campaign that the government would respond to
citizens’ proposals, they aimed to generate in Chilean
social movements a self-limitation that would inhibit
citizen demands.
An incident experienced by members of Llareta illus-
trates the intersection of the Concertación government’s
willingness to talk with popular sectors, its resistance to
their proposals, and its use of the concept of ‘‘democracy’’
to limit demand making. In 1990, health promoters from
Llareta joined with other members of the Metropolitan
Coordination of Poblacional (Shantytown) Health (known
as the ‘‘Metro’’) to ask officials in the Ministry of Health to
take measures to curb an outbreak of meningitis in their
población. The health promoters made the demand with a
sense of urgency, because the same disease, a few years
earlier, had caused the deaths of seven children. The
health groups had already done extensive preventive edu-
cation in the población but came to the ministry asking
for help with objectives they could not accomplish alone,
such as staffing the health clinic with personnel knowl-
edgeable about the disease and closing down centers
where the disease was spreading. The doctor they met
with at the Ministry of Health welcomed them in, offered
them coffee and seats on comfortable furniture, and
praised them for the educational work they had been
doing. When health promoters requested that the govern-
ment take action to curb the spread of meningitis, how-
ever, he explained that there were no funds to deal with
the problem. Unsatisfied with the answer, the health
promoters told him that, ‘‘if there were not an appropriate
response by the authorities, we as a health group would
have a demonstration, like the march in the center of
Santiago that we had held in 1985, because the responses
of today [1990] were the same as then: ‘there aren’t
resources’ ’’ (Grupo de Salud Llareta 1991). Hearing the
threat of a demonstration, the doctor became adamant.
Telling them in no uncertain terms not to hold the march,
he accused them of being traitors (Calvin 1995:167).
Health promoters understood him to be saying that, if
they proceeded with the march, they would be disloyal to
the elected government and could potentially destabilize
the new democracy. Questioning why they had to watch
their children die of a preventable disease in the name of
democracy, they held the march. But far fewer people
participated than had in a similar march in 1985, under
military rule. In 1990, leaders of the Metro became divided,
with some, from groups other than Llareta, persuaded that
they should be loyal to the elected government and not
march.14 The differences in the ways that Llareta and
representatives of the Ministry of Health approached the
problem of meningitis illustrated how for politicians in the
Concertación government economic and social rights had
become distanced from the meanings of democracy, and
elected officials and their functionaries saw their role not
as implementing proposals voiced by citizens but as pro-
tecting the system from pressure from organized groups.
The shift in discourse, from ‘‘the right to be taken into
account’’ and ‘‘listening to the people’’ to democracy as a
set of formal political institutions in which elected repre-
sentatives made decisions in isolation from citizens’
demands, did not entirely reflect a change in underlying
political logic: The elements for a renovated socialism, a
pacted transition, and a need to reassure the political right
and international interests of economic continuities pre-
existed the plebiscite. Rather, the specific goals that pub-
licity about democracy would be used to achieve had
shifted, and with them the discourses circulating about
democracy. The project of convincing undecided voters to
support the anti-Pinochet choice in the 1988 plebiscite
and mobilizing the population in support of the NO
campaign required creating a series of positive connota-
tions for democracy that would capture swing votes. In
contrast, the project of diminishing social movement
activity in the postdictatorship era required a different
public face for democracy, one that minimized social
expectations of change and diverted organized groups’
demands away from the state. Consistent with these
divergent public meanings of democracy was a series of
pacts among governing factions, including the political
right, that limited from the outset the impact that popular
sectors—in their capacity as individual citizens or as social
organizations—could have on policy decisions.
One of the most striking elements of this phenomenon
is the use of technologies of contemporary democracy,
especially political marketing techniques, to insulate policy
making from the impact of citizens while affirming that
democracy was functioning successfully. Specifically, poli-
ticians used public opinion polls to provide evidence that
the public was satisfied with current policies; they thereby
discredited organized groups pressing for change by argu-
ing that such groups were in the minority or outside the
norm. Similarly, politicians used polling to legitimate
policy decisions made without public consent, under the
premise that elites were reflecting public opinion in their
decisions. Maintaining that mechanisms that ‘‘sound
out opinion’’ can ‘‘make [politicians] fully familiar with
the cultural pulsations of the society’’ (Campero 1988:16,
in Joignant 1998:64) and that political marketing is ‘‘a
vehicle by way of which the society makes its aspirations
weigh on the elite’’ (Tironi 1989:4), politicians presented
opinion polls as central not just to the winning of elec-
tions but also to the enactment of participatory democ-
racy (see Joignant 1998:61 – 64; Paley 2001a). That is,
Chilean politicians publicly described opinion polls as the
conduit through which opinion formation would influence
decision making, and they used the polls to legitimate
decisions made without the population’s consent.15
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Overall, in the postdictatorship scenario, officials sought
to convince the public that living in a democracy meant
not expecting the state to solve the population’s prob-
lems. They aimed to persuade grassroots leaders that
limiting social demands on the state was necessary for
preserving democracy: Too much pressure could provoke
the return of military rule. Through such discourses and
publicity campaigns, the link between opinion forma-
tion and decision making—to use Habermas’s terms—
did not just fail to operate; it was intentionally incapaci-
tated. Moreover, the severing of that link was accom-
plished through talk (reasoned discussion about the
state’s limited resources, the need to preserve macroeco-
nomic growth and political stability, and the new relation-
ship between the state and its citizens), in new arenas for
communication between citizens and public officials (pub-
lic assemblies, meetings with community organizations in
governmental offices), within a discourse featuring ‘‘con-
sensus,’’ and—most notably—in the name of enacting and
preserving democracy. Not only was this admonition to
restrict demands conveyed through the discourse of
democracy, but it was also accomplished through the
quintessential technology of contemporary democracy—
political marketing techniques. And, at some level, this
approach achieved its goals. Whereas during the protest
period under the dictatorship, despite danger and fear,
massive mobilizations and strongly organized social move-
ments had denounced and exerted pressure on a state that
was unresponsive to citizens’ demands, the early years of
political democracy saw a relative demobilization of social
movement activity.
Llareta’s vision of democracy
In 1992, two years after the formal transition from military
to elected rule, I asked community leaders in La Bandera
to describe what democracy meant to them.16 I raised this
question because I had heard many comments since I
began my research in Santiago in 1990 indicating that
people did not consider their present system to be a
democracy. Their reservations existed in stark contrast to
the celebration among political elites, social scientists,
and investors around the world of Chile’s transition to de-
mocracy. Untangling this disagreement required under-
standing the meanings these various actors attributed to
the term. In the context of this article, their responses
contribute to the development of a normative vision of
democracy growing out of the strategic decisions so-
cial movements make in response to particular challenges
and dilemmas.
When I opened with the question ‘‘What does democ-
racy mean to you?’’ a health promoter named Mónica
Jeanette responded immediately: ‘‘Democracy is the right
to think [express] one’s ideas and to be heard. To be
listened to. To be taken into account.’’17 Speaking two
years after the end of military rule and the installation of
an elected civilian government, she compared her defini-
tion of democracy with what she saw currently existing.
‘‘Now you can’t say what you really think [express your-
self, speak freely] because of fear [ongoing repression—
disappearances, water cannons used at protests], and if
you do say what you think, you won’t be listened to
anyway.’’ Playing off Mónica Jeanette’s definition that
democracy meant being listened to, Digna gave an exam-
ple close to home: Mariela’s husband didn’t listen to her,
and therefore there was no democracy in Mariela’s house.
Mariela corrected her jokingly: ‘‘There is democracy in my
house. But only for him.’’18
This definition, the first to emerge, is multifaceted.
The women were saying that democracy entailed the
ability to express one’s ideas without fear. It was the right
to talk, to speak out. In their view, the kinds of political
repression used during the dictatorship—for example, the
water cannons and tear gas used at protests—had been
maintained under the elected government, thereby inhib-
iting people from openly expressing their opinions. But
their definition also included having one’s ideas listened
to, being ‘‘taken into account.’’ I interpret that to mean
not only that those with decision-making power hear what
one is saying but that one’s ideas will also have an effect,
an impact on society and on policy.
When I asked if having one’s ideas taken into account
was the full definition of democracy, I was told that there
was more to the concept. Democracy is not only the right
to free expression, Mónica Jeanette said, but also ‘‘all the
rights. . . . It includes rights to housing, [to] dignified
nutrition, to study.’’ Again, the community leaders imme-
diately contrasted their definition of democracy to the
existing situation: Currently there are children without
access to milk or meat, they said, and young people who
cannot go to university. Therefore, the women concluded,
we are not living in a democracy.
In this second set of meanings, democracy is equated
with citizens’ rights. These include a set of economic pro-
visions such as housing and nutrition, some of which—like
education—are set alongside political rights in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. In these women’s view,
whether or not people in their neighborhood had access
to necessities such as nutrition and housing could be used
to determine whether or not democracy existed.
Because all of the women’s evidence supported the
conclusion that the current situation was not a democracy,
I asked them to describe occasions on which they had
experienced democracy. In response to this, they gave
examples from local organizations. At the olla común
(‘‘common pot’’ cooking collective) ‘‘everyone makes the
same food and everyone eats the same, and [the food] is
divided equally. They go out together to ask for ingredients
in the market. So they are united and are democratic in
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apportioning the food.’’ Similarly, at an event held at a
local child care center where facilitators distributed used
clothing, ‘‘they give you a voucher for 500 pesos. Everyone
has the right to four pieces of clothing and one pair of
shoes. Everyone is igual (the same, equal). They could let
the people with more money have more clothing. But
instead, everyone gets the same [amount]. So they are
democratic in dividing the goods.’’ ‘‘So there is democracy
in small organizations,’’ the women concluded. ‘‘The poor
treat each other equally among ourselves.’’
The workshop participants immediately contrasted
these community-run organizations with those they con-
sidered undemocratic. The prime example of an undemo-
cratic organization was the municipal-run health clinic,
where, ‘‘if you don’t have money, you’re not welcome.
Before, they saw you for free. Now, if you don’t have the
thousand pesos you’re supposed to contribute, you take
your sick child home with you without [the child] being
seen [by medical staff].’’ At the población’s health clinic,
they continued, ‘‘you don’t [even] have the right to ask
questions. They barely look at the kids. You can complain
and [nothing happens].’’ At private clinics where patients
pay for service, ‘‘the same doctors do totally different
things—you can ask as many questions as you like.’’ ‘‘In
contrast,’’ concluded Mariela, ‘‘they humiliate the poor
so much.’’
From these descriptions, a third set of meanings
emerges: Democracy means equality, be it the egalitarian
allocation of resources within a group or throughout
society, or behavioral and interpersonal qualities such as
respect rather than humiliation. Equality does not just
extend to political rights; it means that people have access
to public services regardless of their financial situation. In
this sense, it is linked to the prior meaning—the rights of
all to the fulfillment of their needs. The description of
activities at the olla común further suggests the impor-
tance of cooperation among members of a collectivity.
Democracy is not just a set of rights that adhere to each
individual but, rather, a process achieved when a group
works collectively to treat each participant fairly.
Notably, the one time that workshop participants said
they had experienced democracy outside of local organi-
zations was during the time of Allende’s Popular Unity
government. They associated that period with economic
redistribution (particularly access to milk), quality of life,
and the cultural valorization of popular culture, the poor,
and the left. The Allende period was a primary reference
point for every major group in Chile: not only for health
promoters, who valorized it as exemplary of democracy,
but also for renovated politicians of the Concertación, who
blamed it for the breakdown of consensus that led to the
military coup, and for Pinochet’s followers, who made it
the specter of evil that promised to recur with the return of
an elected-civilian regime. It is important to note, however,
that the health groups’ use of the Allende period as a
benchmark for democracy is in part a retrospective analy-
sis responding to contemporary discourses and problems.
Prior to and during Allende’s presidency (1970–73), the
political left, including popular sectors, was less intent on
defining or promoting democracy as a goal than on ad-
vancing a movement toward socialism.
As I listened to the responses, I was struck by the
fact that in the entire discussion of democracy virtually
no mention had been made of elections or political
institutions. So I raised the topic myself. I told the group
that in my readings I had frequently come across the
view that democracy involves periodic elections of public
officials. I asked them what they thought of that idea.
The community leaders considered the possibility out
loud, running it through their own experiences with
elected government. One recalled a political demonstra-
tion she had attended in which she saw a protester
beaten by police. ‘‘And the elected senators were there,
and saw [it happening], and didn’t do anything.’’ ‘‘So,’’
she concluded, ‘‘how can you say there is democracy?’’
Another commented, ‘‘The press are always saying that
[President] Aylwin is in Venezuela, [for example, or] in
New York. But they never say [that] he has gone to a
población in Chile. He doesn’t go to see the conditions in
which the poor live. He couldn’t care less about the
poor.’’ One woman observed, ‘‘What is happening with
Aylwin will happen with any president. The same hunger
and no one has rights, because the guy doesn’t listen.’’
Another woman added, ‘‘They say that now that we have
elected representatives they’ll solve the problems and
represent the poor. But they don’t. They don’t fulfill their
promises.’’ These responses suggested that, although
elections and formally representative political institutions
are not incompatible with democracy, having an elected
legislature and president does not in and of itself consti-
tute democracy. Instead, what matters is what those
officials do while in office: whether they protect people’s
rights, whether they fight to improve living conditions,
whether they take into consideration the needs and
expressed desires of the people, and whether they keep
their promises. And, so, for the workshop participants, a
fourth meaning of democracy was the ability and will-
ingness of elected officials to defend the interests of
citizens, especially the poor.
In articulating these various meanings of democracy,
the community leaders were more interested in denounc-
ing than in setting forth ideals. They spoke more fluidly
and passionately about why the current situation was not a
democracy than about what an optimal democracy would
be. In so doing, they utilized a practice of denunciation
that was common among Chilean social movements tar-
geting problems and abuses during the military regime.
But their rhetorical style also suggests the possibility that
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normative ‘‘counterfactual’’ formulations are a luxury more
available to professional intellectuals like Habermas than
to people immediately involved in social struggle—or at
least to those engaged in pragmatic, not purely ideological,
endeavors. Indeed, for the health promoters, democracy
was not conceived as an abstract possibility (although it
may have been framed that way during efforts to end the
dictatorship in the 1980s); by 1992 the idea was, for all
practical purposes, inseparable from its actually existing
version in Chile. As I discussed earlier, when examining
the Concertación’s usages, that version was embedded in
and invoked other political processes, including free mar-
ket economics, the rightward movement of the political
left, and the defeat of socialism as an alternative project.
Finally, it is striking that the health group members so
tenaciously invoked the issue of rights. Their adherence to
that vocabulary—also an internationally circulating set of
institutions, practices, and ideas—raises the question of
whether their discussion of democracy itself occurred only
when elicited (as when I asked what democracy meant to
them) or in response to others’ (politicians’ and the news
media’s) uses of ‘‘democracy’’ that they chose to critique.
Democracy discourse was central to the Concertación
politicians in the years of political transition; although
the health group had a strong normative vision of democ-
racy, democracy discourse was not necessarily central to
how the health group organized its thinking about political
processes in Chile.
In sum, analysis of NO campaign publicity material
and promotional flyers for the Aylwin presidential candi-
dacy shows a close correspondence between the meanings
of democracy embedded in campaign literature just before
the transition and the meanings asserted by health group
members in the early 1990s. These meanings emphasized
equality of access to public services, dignity and justice,
and the need for public officials to take seriously citizens’
demands. Whereas the similarity between the definitions
of democracy may indicate that the health group appropri-
ated meanings first established in the political campaigns,
it may also reflect a process through which popular aspi-
rations articulated by broad social movements in the
1980s were incorporated into publicity for the NO and
presidential campaigns. The major difference in outlook
between the two sets of definitions is reflected in the
health group, by 1992, no longer being able to associate
dictatorship with all that was bad and democracy with all
that was good. Instead, the group faced a changed scenario
in which political organizing and popular mobilization
had become more difficult under political democracy than
it had been under dictatorship, whereas getting responses
from public officials remained equally hard. The central
question that emerged, then, was how community organi-
zations like Llareta could play a role in influencing public
policy that would then impact the other aspects of democ-
racy of which they spoke—equality and dignity, access to
resources to meet their needs, the fulfillment of basic rights.
Potentials and limitations of deliberation
For Habermas, deliberation is a centerpiece for normative
democratic theory. The case of the Santiago health group
Llareta shows both the potentials and the limitations of
that approach. As a group, members of Llareta regularly
engaged in deliberation. They analyzed political reality,
debated interpretations and courses of action, and edu-
cated a broader population on political issues. In discus-
sion, the group formed opinions about public issues and
spoke about them in a variety of venues. Their work
included, for example, holding ‘‘conversational teas’’ in
which residents of their neighborhood were provided a
space to discuss elements of their experience and to look
at their broader implications.
Deliberation in these contexts, however, was not an
end in itself. Its significance is in part captured by Jane
Mansbridge, who describes ‘‘deliberative enclaves of resis-
tance’’ as places where people who have lost out under
coercive circumstances in existing democracies can ‘‘re-
work their ideas and their strategies, gathering their forces
and deciding in a more protected space in what way or
whether to continue the battle’’ (1996:4–7). Deliberation
in a grassroots organization provides the space to develop
critiques, articulate visions, analyze political events, re-
ceive training, and strategize in an atmosphere that per-
mits the incorporation of moods, emotions, and reflections
on experiences, the use of a language that is comfortable
and familiar to the participants, and the potential to relate
to other people with similar experiences. In the words of a
scholar of Chile, ‘‘Deliberative enclaves provide an incu-
bator for the articulation of the counterdiscourses that
citizens can use in contesting the state on the terrain of
public space. Moreover, they link grassroots organizations
to social networks and political organizations that can
facilitate politicized deliberation’’ (Greaves 2003:4). In this
context, the deliberation accomplished in this arena is not
by itself a manifestation of democracy. It has the more far-
reaching purpose of challenging relations of power that
determine whose knowledge will be considered legitimate,
who gets to make important decisions, and what those
decisions will be.
Health promoters had a process for broadcasting the
views developed through deliberation publicly, something
akin to what Habermas has called ‘‘publicity.’’ They dis-
seminated their views by distributing instructional mate-
rial in the local outdoor market, reading open letters at
public forums, running educational workshops at schools,
preparing articles for publication in a journal, and speak-
ing at international conferences. In their presentations
they used a series of rhetorical styles and presentational
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forms, including popular theater, mural art, and slogans
(when denouncing what they considered injustices). When
addressing public officials, they at times rationalized their
mode of presentation by employing statistical data and by
using technical vocabulary that, in their view, approxi-
mated that of officials and professionals (see Paley 2001a).
These capacities and routines have been made possi-
ble in Latin America through a set of processes by which
citizens, especially the poor, have been actively trained
to engage in political analysis. Drawing on theoretical –
practical work such as Gramsci’s writings about organic
intellectuals and the popular education work of Paolo
Freire, nongovernmental organizations, labor unions,
church groups, and political parties have taught critical
reflection on contemporary political processes (Educación
Popular en Salud n.d.; Taller PIRET 1990). But, impor-
tantly, opinion formation in these approaches is not iso-
lated from decision making, as it would be in the weak
publics envisioned by Habermas. Rather, as expressed by
the term praxis (Gramsci 1971:323–343), the process of
political analysis has been oriented toward developing
modes of action by which social movements could achieve
certain ends.19
Toward the end of The Structural Transformation of
the Public Sphere, Habermas is concerned about the de-
cline of reasoned argument that accompanied the demise
of the bourgeois public sphere and the advent of mass
democracy. Citing Dahl (1989), he notes that citizens’
ability to form public opinion deteriorates when decisions
are delegated to experts and technocrats, because a lack of
detailed knowledge about a subject and a lack of experi-
ence in deliberation erodes the public’s ability to make its
own informed arguments (Habermas 1996a:317). In this
article, I have described how Llareta engaged in delibera-
tion that enabled it to construct arguments and form
opinion. The impediment to democracy in this case was,
therefore, not that citizens were incapable of engaging in
reasoned discourse and critical argument—that public
spheres and public opinion did not truly exist, as Haber-
mas feared—but, rather, that this public opinion in fact
did not translate into public policy.20
Conclusion: Accountable democracy
Habermas’s decision to link deliberation to democracy
presumes that opinion formation in the public sphere will
influence decision making in parliament. In this article, I
have explored a case—postdictatorship Chile—in which
political officials at times intentionally acted to impede
the influence of public opinion on governmental decision
making. In this kind of situation, deliberation alone would
be a precarious foundation for normative democratic
theory. It is in this context that I have suggested ‘‘account-
able democracy’’ as an alternative. Accountable democracy
means both that politicians should be held accountable
for fulfilling public demands and that, in the words of
Chilean community leaders, citizens’ opinions will be
‘‘taken into account’’ in the decision-making process.
As I have indicated, the normative concept of ‘‘ac-
countable democracy’’ differs from Habermas’s ‘‘deliber-
ative democracy’’ in that it makes society’s impact on
legislation, as enunciated by organized citizens, the piv-
otal analytical point for what democracy might mean.
Accountable democracy also differs from deliberative
democracy in that it foregrounds outcome, rather than pro-
cedure. Because the route to accountability is unknown
amid novel political conditions, it is to be worked out in the
strategic calculations of social movements and organized
collectivities responding to changing historical contexts.
Given these preoccupations, the proposed normative
framework is centered less around a procedure than
around a question: How can citizens hold ruling author-
ities, institutions, and systems accountable to their
demands? The question responds to historical conditions
in contemporary democracies in which, (1) although
citizens have the vote, many major decisions are no
longer made by legislatures within nation-states but,
rather, by transnational corporations, international finan-
cial institutions, or international trade organizations not
accountable to the electorate (see also Ferguson 1993); (2)
popular sectors are excluded from decision making and
policy development in elite-controlled and technocrati-
cally organized political democracies; and (3) talk is used
to achieve demobilization through persuasion. Under
these circumstances, the dilemma facing citizens’ groups
may be, first, how to hold government (and nongovern-
mental entities) accountable and, second, how to them-
selves take part in making crucial decisions, not only
delegating that responsibility to political elites. In The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas
(1989:28) writes that the bourgeois public sphere not only
engaged in critical rational debate about political issues
but it also transformed modes of rule. Using the idea of
‘‘accountable democracy’’ as a standard, one can ask how
that might be possible in contemporary democracies.
True accountability would need to include not only na-
tional government but also international financial institu-
tions, dispersed corporate actors, and other sites of power.
In the case of the health group described in this article,
transforming modes of rule would likely mean that citi-
zens did not merely delegate decision making to national
elected leaders whom they influenced powerfully through
opinion formation and communication mechanisms. It
would also mean staking out participation in decision
making for the public(s) at large, specifically, the urban
poor—a phenomenon that Fraser (1992) might call creat-
ing ‘‘strong subaltern counterpublics.’’ Such an enabling
of opinion formers to be decision makers is at the heart of
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Llareta’s concept of ‘‘participation’’ (Garcı́a 2001; Paley
2001b:170 – 171). The idea is not to be confused with
‘‘empowerment’’ or with the delegation of responsibility
to community groups that has been part of international
financial institutions’ and national governments’ celebra-
tion and utilization of civil society organizations (Leiva
2001; Paley 2001b:143 –147). Rather, it has to do with a
revised notion of ‘‘democracy,’’ in which citizens impact
decision making in the strongest way.
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1. Although intriguing, such an approach is also ironic, given
the historical fact that the bourgeois public sphere experienced its
precipitous decline precisely amid the inclusion of broader seg-
ments of the population in the political arena with the advent of
mass democracy. Indeed, a number of constructive critics have
pointed out the gender and class exclusions inherent in the self-
proclaimed egalitarian public spheres of the 18th and 19th cen-
turies (see, e.g., Eley 1992, Fraser 1992, and Ryan 1992).
2. Kay Warren helped clarify this point.
3. General Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998 on human
rights charges but returned to Chile in 2000. There he also faced
many charges but was found mentally unfit to stand trial. In
2002 he resigned his senate position so as to benefit from the
legal immunity accorded to former presidents under Chilean law.
In August 2004 the Chilean Supreme Court removed Pinochet’s
immunity from prosecution.
4. For a comparative analysis of democratic transitions in Latin
America, see Coronil 1998 and Borón 1998.
5. All translations from Spanish that appear in this article
are mine.
6. For more information on EPES and the health groups it
trained, see Calvin 1995. For an ethnographic account of EPES
and the health group Llareta, see Paley 2001b.
7. For a review of anthropological studies of democracy, see
Paley 2002.
8. The flyers I quote are from a Chile ephemera collection
contained in the Princeton University Library Department of Rare
Books and Special Collection. For more information on this
collection, see Paley and Carrera 1996.
9. The pamphlet from which these quotes were taken was likely
produced by the Aylwin campaign and likely dates to 1989. The
pamphlet itself is undated and gives no indication of the specific
individual or organization that produced it.
10. For an overview of subsequent critiques of the democracy
of agreements, see Joignant and Menéndez-Carrión 1999.
11. Like other Chileans writing about the renovation process,
Cuevas Farren (1993) attributes the agreed-on concept of ‘‘democ-
racy’’ to a definition advanced by Samuel Huntington. See, for
example, Gajardo Lagomarsino 1993:37, who cites Huntington
1986:8.
12. In the words of one observer, ‘‘The style that the govern-
ment has developed is to seek social concertations that give
backing to its policies’’ (Benavente Urbina 1993:73). In this pro-
cess, ‘‘the conversations with labor and business leaders have
been the tonic for legitimating the economic scheme’’ (Benavente
Urbina 1993:73, emphasis added).
13. Although I have chosen to contrast the 1988 plebiscite
and 1989 election campaign literature with the Concertación’s
approach in the first years of democracy, Concertación politicians
assert that, even in the preelection campaigns, they did not raise
expectations and that the idea of tempering citizens’ demands was
under discussion before they took office. I base my reading of the
public face given to democracy in the NO campaign for the
plebiscite on pamphlets in circulation in 1988 and 1989. This
analysis does not preclude the possibility, however, that political
leaders had long-standing plans to provide only limited responses
to public demands. Further analysis of publicity brochures would
need to take into account how centralized or decentralized the
production of campaign literature was, given that, unlike televi-
sion spots, which were produced by established and coordinated
committees, written literature could be created and distributed by
a wide range of groups supporting the NO campaign.
Edgardo Boeninger (Minister Secretary General to the Presi-
dency in the government of Patricio Aylwin) did not see the
linking of democracy to economic improvement as incompatible
with the lowering of expectations for rapid economic change. He
held that the government was signaling to Chileans that the
problems would not be solved immediately because of budgetary
limitations; nonetheless, the government would immediately
begin to address them (Boeninger 1990:62).
14. The Metro disbanded, whereas Llareta continues to exist as
of this writing. Part of its endurance as an independent and critical
organization may be due to Llareta’s decision not to acquire
official legal status (personalidad jurı́dica) or to take funding or
employment from the government, actions that have led to
cooptation or absorption of other organizations.
15. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
Habermas critiques similar assertions and practices, by using
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the terms manufactured publicity and nonpublic opinion
(1989:211– 222).
16. This discussion on the meanings of democracy was one of
a series of ‘‘workshop’’ (taller) sessions I held in 1992 with a va-
riety of community leaders in La Bandera, including members
of Llareta. Themes of other sessions were urban space, municipal
elections, and social movement strategy. The discussions served
as collective interviews to inform my research, but some, such as
the one on urban space, were incorporated by health group
members into their ongoing activities. For further details, see
Paley 2001b:16 – 17.
17. I detected very little disagreement among the individuals
who participated in this session. The discussion was characterized
by a process in which people built on each other’s ideas, finished
each other’s sentences, and gave examples to prove each other’s
points. In fact, at times I found it difficult to attribute particular
statements to specific individuals, and a number of the state-
ments I include in the text reflect the input of a number of people.
Giving credence to Coombe’s (1998), Young’s (1996), and Fraser’s
(1992) observations about variations across genders in communi-
cative styles, this style clearly differs from Habermas’s vision of
rational argument, although it still constitutes critical and rea-
soned discourse.
18. Although I do not know whether these women had it in
mind at the time they made these comments, a feminist slogan
circulating in Chile during the 1980s called for ‘‘Democracy in the
home as well as in the country.’’
19. In distinguishing between nonformal education (NFE) and
popular education (PE), one summary states that ‘‘NFE accents
methodological changes without taking any position regarding the
popular classes and their struggles for justice and freedom.’’ In
contrast ‘‘PE makes a clear option for the popular classes and links
the educational process to their demands, interests and needs’’
(Educación Popular en Salud n.d.). According to one definition,
popular education is ‘‘a process through which the popular classes
present, analyze and critique their own understanding of the
world in relation to a broader aim of structural transformation’’
(SIDEC/CIES Conference 1985, in Educación Popular en Salud
n.d., emphasis added).
20. Members of Llareta described this phenomenon in a paper
they presented at the Latin American Studies Association Con-
gress, in September 2001 (Garcı́a 2001). They wrote,
In the first attempts at work in conjunction with the
Municipality of San Ramón and the health clinic in our
población, we realized that what they wanted in practice
were ‘‘useful dummies’’ that had no type of impact on
the initiatives being proposed by the government and
that we would carry out by way of volunteer work, in
order to conserve resources for the State. For example,
in 1992 they invited us to participate along with the
health clinic in a sanitary campaign against tuberculo-
sis. They asked us to participate without ever explaining
to us the objectives for what they were requesting that
we do. [Garcı́a 2001:4]
The health group relates this limited role for community
organizations to the ways citizens’ intervention in decision mak-
ing has been reduced to voting:
We see that if at the level of official discourse the
governments tend to value initiatives by social organi-
zations, in practice these experiences have been char-
acterized by not developing instances of effective
participation that include decision-making that goes
beyond electoral participation. We have seen how, in
election periods, the candidates from various political
parties approach our organizations to obtain votes, gen-
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